After August saw the first UK rate cut of this cycle following an Monetary Policy Committee vote that was split by the finest of margins, the decision by the Bank of England to hold rates at 5% in September was determined by a comprehensive majority with only one member of the committee dissenting. The MPC was also unanimously agreed in continuing the process of quantitative tightening (QT) at £100bn per year. This decision on QT is unlikely to have any significant implications for monetary policy transmission, although it will slightly reduce costs to the Treasury due to the fact that fewer gilts will need to be actively sold compared to previous rounds of QT.
The latest y-o-y CPI print for August registered at 2.2%, notably below the MPC’s latest forecast of 2.4%, but this was not enough to convince the MPC to continue its rate cutting cycle. A combination of high services inflation, high nominal wage growth and broader concerns around the labour market (for example, the worrying growth in inactivity rates) meant the vast majority of MPC members need to see further evidence of disinflation before backing another rate cut.
Our current economic outlook for the UK can be viewed in Handelsbanken’s latest Global Macro Forecast Opens in a new window, something that we publish three times a year. In light of the succession of shocks to hit the UK economy, the base-case scenario is a relatively sanguine one with modest projected growth of 1.1% in 2024 and 1.6% in both 2025 and 2026. As mentioned in the previous Rate Wrap, growth in real wages and the potential for savings rates to fall should help provide a reasonable tailwind to UK growth in the coming 18 months or so.
Of course, there are a series of risks that could upset this relatively sanguine outlook. There has been widespread speculation as to what taxation measures could be contained within the Budget of 30 October. Fears around this are showing up in confidence metrics: consumer confidence nosedived in September, registering at -20, down from -13, and the most commonly-cited concern in the latest PMI data was fiscal policy uncertainty ahead of the Budget. We hope this hit to confidence will be short-lived, especially since our “Misery Index” suggests that fundamentals of the UK economy do not warrant this kind of pessimism (see Figure 2).
The potential risk to confidence from international developments could end up being more material. The US election, just one week after the UK Budget, has the potential to prompt significant public policy changes from the world’s largest economy that could end up reverberating around the global economy. Then, of course, there are potential short-term energy shocks arising from escalating conflict in the Middle East along with more medium-term risks associated with the conflict between China and Taiwan that could end up causing major disruptions to the supply chain of semi-conductors. I suspect these international issues may start featuring more prominently in the economic outlooks of developed nations as 2024 progresses and we go into 2025.
For now, our base-case view on interest policy remains that set out the Global Macro Forecast. This suggests that inflation may end up being more stubborn than the Bank of England’s latest modal projection and that, while rates are expected to continue falling, the pace will be slow and smooth. Our expectations are for there to be a further rate cut down to 4.75% in November, with base rate gradually falling to 3% over the course of the next two years. We currently believe that neutral rates lie somewhere just beneath 3%, meaning that monetary policy would still be restrictive at this level.
Daniel Mahoney, UK Economist